Photo by Dennis Buurman
1. “Review of Normative Concepts, by Matti Eklund,” in: Journal of Moral Philosophy, forthcoming. (Accepted 19 May 2019.)
2. "Love, Reasons, and Desire" in: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2020, online first at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-020-10084-1
This paper defends subjectivism about the reasons we have to treat those we love especially well against objections.
3. "A Humean Constructivist Reading of J. S. Mill's Utilitarian Theory," in: Utilitas 28 (2), 2016, pp. 189-214.
This paper was a section of my Honours thesis, which was on the metaethical views of utilitarian philosophers. I argue that Mill is not a moral realist and does not believe in certain kinds of obligations, those involving external reasons and obligations with a particular, strong kind of practical authority. In this paper I argue that Mill’s metaethical position can be interpreted as a Humean constructivist view, but I'd now describe it more simply as moral subjectivism.
For an excellent critique of this paper, see Peter Zuk, "Mill's Metaethical Non-cognitivism," Utilitas 30 (3), 2018, pp. 271-293. Zuk gives an argument I agree with, that I was wrong about Mill being a Humean constructivist (or as I’d say now, a subjectivist) about all practical reasons; however, I still think Mill is a subjectivist about moral reasons.
4. "Is Moral Bioenhancement Dangerous?" in: Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (1), 2016 (published online first, 2015), pp. 3-6.
This paper was written for a course I did in my Honours year. The course had three modules, and one was on moral bioenhancement, led by Nick Agar. This a response to his paper "Moral Bioenhancement is Dangerous".