Photo by Dennis Buurman
1. “Review of Normative Concepts, by Matti Eklund,” in: Journal of Moral Philosophy, forthcoming.
2. "A Humean Constructivist Reading of J. S. Mill's Utilitarian Theory," in: Utilitas 28 (2), 2016, pp. 189-214.
This paper was a section of my Honours thesis, which was on the metaethical views of utilitarian philosophers. I argue that Mill is not a moral realist and does not believe in certain kinds of obligations, those involving external reasons and obligations with a particular, strong kind of practical authority. In this paper I argue that Mill’s metaethical position can be interpreted as a Humean constructivist view, but I'd now describe it more simply as moral subjectivism.
For an excellent critique of this paper, see Peter Zuk, "Mill's Metaethical Non-cognitivism," Utilitas 30 (3), 2018, pp. 271-293. Zuk gives an argument I agree with, that I was wrong about Mill being a Humean constructivist (or as I’d say now, a subjectivist) about practical reason; however, I still think Mill is a subjectivist about moral reasons.
3. "Is Moral Bioenhancement Dangerous?" in: Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (1), 2015, pp. 3-6.
This paper was written for a course I did in my Honours year. The course had three modules, and one was on moral bioenhancement, led by Nick Agar. This a response to his paper "Moral Bioenhancement is Dangerous".
1. A paper on metaethics and love, under review from January 2019.
2.. A paper on virtue ethics and wellbeing, under review from November 2019.